Economists have devoted substantial resources to estimating the intertemporal substitution elasticity for labor supply because this elasticity plays a crucial role in the real business cycle literature. Generally, the estimates of the elasticity have been too low to explain bus iness cycles. Economists have responded by trying to modify real business cycle models to allow for smaller elasticities, but they have experienced mixed success at best. However, the standard intertemporal substitution model has not done well when tested, and if this model is incorrect, so will be the estimated labor supply elasticities based upon it.
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I. Introduction
The intertemporal labor supply elasticity plays a crucial role in standard equilibrium or real business cycle mode ls. As a result, economists have devoted substantial resources to estimating this elasticity (MaCurdy 1981; Altonji 1986; Ham 1986; Abowd and Card 1987; Hansen and Wright 1992; Card 1994; Reilly 1995; Millard, Scott and Sensier 1999; Ham and Reilly 2002; French 2003) . The general conclusion from this evidence is that theorists should modify the standard model to dampen the response of labor supply to wage changes. Recent Real Business Cycle models have considered many modifications in an attempt to reduce the labor supply elasticity that is necessary for the model to fit the data including intertemporal nonseparablities (Kydland and Prescott 1982; Hotz, Kydland, and Sedacek 1988) , imperfect substitution between public and private consumption (Christiano and Eichenbaum 1992) , the possibility of labor hoarding by firms (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 1993) , and the existence of an imperfect consumption insurance market (Li 1999) , employer information imperfections (Alexopoulos 2000; Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher 1999) . In spite of this effort, it seems fair to say that the theory and the data are still far apart.
A natural reaction to this problem is to consider other models of the labor market. Quandt and Rosen (1988) have proposed a disequilibrium model where hours worked and desired labor supply. Alternatively, several authors have suggested the implicit contract model. In this model firms and workers bargain over state-contingent contracts denominated in terms of consumption and hours of labor supply. The price of leisure is the marginal product of labor or the shadow wage, which differs from the observed wage (Azariadis 1975; Bailey 1974; Rosen 1985 ; Thomas and Worrall 1988; Osano and Inoue 2 1991; Beaudry and DiNardo 1991, 1995) . Further, while the evidence from micro data on the standard intertemporal labor supply model (Ham 1986; Card 1994; Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; French 2000; Ham and Reilly 2002 ) and the disequilibrium model (Ham and Reilly 2002 ) is generally quite negative, the implicit contract model has done much better in testing (Abowd and Card 1987, 1989; Beaudry and DiNardo 1991, 1995; Osano and Inoue 1991; Cooley and Ogaki 1996; Ham and Reilly 2002) .
If the implicit contract model is the correct model, then the fact that the standard model produces elasticities that are too low is irrelevant because the model is inappropriate for the data. Instead we would want to measure the intertemporal elasticity from an empirical version of the implicit contract model (which is supported by the data).
Unfortunately this is a non-trivial task since the price of leisure is not observed in this model. In this paper we first show that the restrictions of consumer theory allow use to estimate the interte mporal labor supply elasticity in a contract. Specifically, we specify a utility function that is nonseparable in labor supply and consumption. We then note that the shadow wage will enter both the labor supply and consumption (demand) function and take the differential (first difference) of these equations. Next, we assume that the change in the shadow wage is a unknown linear function of of the change in observed market variables (industry and occupation unemployment rates). We substitute the shadow wage equation into the labor supply and consumption equations yielding a reduced form model where the coefficients are functions of the labor supply and consumption parameters and the coefficients of the shadow wage equation. Finally we show that the symmetry restriction on demand systems is sufficient to identify the 3 intertemporal labor supply elasticity from the reduced form. 1 We then implement this approach using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) for the period 1985 to 1992 and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We describe our approach in some detail in Section II. In Section III we discuss the CES and PSID data sets. Section IV contains our empirical results. We estimate the intertemporal elasticity to be betwee n 0.5 and 1. 5, although there is some sensitivity of the results to the instrument matrix.
Section V concludes the pape r.
1 They only other paper in the literature to attempt this is the very interesting on by Abowd and Card (1987) . The use a very different identification strategy than we do and make a number of addit ional assumptions. First, they estimate a fixed marginal utility of wealth model. Second they assume that consumption equal labor earnings, i.e there is no savings or dissavings. Third they assume consumption is separable from labor supply. On the other hand, they allow for different equations for individuals with more than one employer over the sample period. Their estimate for all workers from the NLS stationary model is quite similar to ours. However, their estimates from the non-stationary model for both the PSID and NLS are quite larger than ours, i.e. 7.27 and 4.34 respectively as compared to .5 to 1.5.
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I. Framework for Testing the Implicit Contract Model.
A. Implicit Contract Model.
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The implicit contract view of the labor market is an equilibrium perspective:
workers and firms bargain over state-contingent contracts denominated in terms of consumption and hours of labor supply in the context of diversifiable risk. The uncertainty faced by workers and firms consists of the different possible states of the world that determine the worker's productivity. In this context the firm offers a contract that specifies a bundle of hours of labor supply and consumption that is dependent on the ex-post realized productivity of the worker. 3 The contract represents consumption insurance for the worker that is constrained by the expected output of the firm, and not actual output. The efficient solution for this model is that the within-period marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption is equal to the marginal product of labor. This is no longer necessarily equal to the wage rate because of the insurance nature of the bargain between the worker and the firm. 4 So, for the implicit contract model, the price of leisure is the individual's revealed marginal product or as we will refer to it, the shadow wage. We formulate the implicit contract model in terms of the maximization of an individual's utility subject to the profit constraint faced by the firm. 
where, ρ is a rate of time preference and t E is an expectation operator.
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The basic profit constraint in the implicit contract model is that expected output of the firm is equal to the expected consumption payments. The previous micro literature has related consumption package negotiated with labor earnings received (Abowd and Card 1987, Beaudry and DiNardo 1995) . However, like our earlier work, we will deviate from this standard set-up and define the problem in terms expenditure on goods (nondurable) to define the firm's expected consumption payments to its workers. This set-up is necessary if we are to allow for the observed within-period nonseparabilities.
Further, it has the advantage of avoiding the use of labor earnings which indirectly allows the hourly wage back into the problem, thus avoiding the well known measurement error problems associated with this variable (French 2003; Kim and Solon 2002 8 The returns to scale assumption, and the failu re to model explicitly asset accumulation as well, simplifies the exposition. See Osano and Inoue (1991) for such a model. 9 Readers of Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) may want to redefine the functions in (7) 
where 12 and tt ZZ are industrial and occupational unemployment respectively.
At this point we face two possible routes. One is to assume explicit functional forms in (9) and (10) and add error terms to these equations and substitute (11) into (9) and (10).
Given distributional assumptions for the error terms we can integrate * s t w out of these 10 We drop 2t q since we only use one consumption measure in each data set -in the PSID only food consumption is available. 8 equations and obtain parameter estimates. We defer this approach to future work and take a different route. We take the differential of (9) and (10) Of particular of interest for this paper is the sign restriction that 11 β is positive in the implicit contract model. This indicates that the contract between the individual and the firm has the property that more labor supply is required when good states of the world are revealed.
We follow Abbott and Ashenfelter (1976) 
The advantage of equation (14) We follow Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985: 520-521) Simple inspection indicates that 11 β is not identified from estimation of (22) and (24 
Our estimates of 11 β obtained from either equation (26) or (27) provides a theoretical test of the implicit contract model in that a positive estimate should be obtained 11 ; however, we will not obtain an elasticity. Like the individual's marginal product of labor, the average marginal product of labor is not observable. However, under the assumption that 11 In future work we will use minimum distance to estimate 11 β when both unemployment rates are included.
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expected profits from the contracts on offer are zero, it is then reasonable to assume that the expected marginal product is equal to the expected wage payment. Otherwise, the contracts being offered under equation (2) would not satisfy the constraint. This argument suggests that a reasonable proxy for the average shadow wage is the average hourly wage and our estimate of the intertemporal elasticity is
where:
s w is the average shadow wage ; h is the average annual hours of labor supply; and w is the average hourly wage.
III. Data Sets
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A. Consumer Expenditure Survey
Our first data set is the quarterly Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES), and we use data from the second quarter of 1985 (1985.2) to the fourth quarter of 1992 (1992.4).
This data set can not be used to generate a standard first-differences analysis. For each individual there is only a nine-month time difference between the two annual labor supply variables and only one annual consumption expenditure variable can be generated.
This requires us to use a cohort analysis, and in developing it the first decision is what age range and then how this age range is broken into individual cohorts. We have followed the general literature (Attanasio and Weber 1995; Browning, Deaton, and Irish 1985; Deaton 1985) and settled on 5-year cohort bands which in the 1985.2 range between the ages of 21 and 55 yields a total of seven cohorts: (1) The development of the actual sample takes place in two stages: first, in each quarterly release we select all observations on their final interview in which either the reference person or their spouse in the Consumer Unit (CU) is a male and a member of one of the age cohorts. Then, we require that this individual be in the sample for the three previous interviews required to calculate the annual consumption expenditure measure.
12 This extended data section is a substitute for Appendix A that will provide a complete description of the data sets used in this paper. The appendix will be available at the authors web sites in the Fall of 2003.
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To obtain reasonable cell sizes we have imposed no other restrictions on the CES sample.
Over the almost 8-year period we obtain 12,790 observations, with cohort cell sizes ranging between 24 (Cohort (1) Cohort averages are then calculated and form the data used in the estimation.
In estimating equations (22) and (24) we are again using the fifth interview's CES code, and they are both available at a onedigit level of aggregation. We match them with the BLS unemployment rates for the average unemployment rate in the 12 months prior to the month of the fifth interview. In terms of the occupation coding in the CES, there is a one-to-one match with the BLS unemployment series; however, for industry we are required to make two modifications in the matching process to obtain consistent series. 13 After taking cohort averages we obtain average cohort industry or occupation unemployment rate. Finally, the lagged unemployment rates are based on the cohort's industry or occupation in period t-1.
In the CES there is a wealth of choice as to the measure of consumption that the researcher can use in the analysis. Researchers in the consumption literature both at the macro (e.g. Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers 1985; Kocherlakota 1996) and micro (e.g.
Attanasio and Weber 1995; Brav, Constantinides and Geczy 1999) data combine nondurable and services expenditures. Our measure is similar, except that we separate non-durables (good 1) from services (good 2). 14 Our actual measure of nondurable expenditures is the sum of expenditure categories: food and beverage; alcohol; apparel; tobacco; and gas and oil, and converted into 1984 dollars with the BLS nondurable price index.
After differencing the data set covers the second quarter of 1986 (1986.2) to the fourth quarter of 1992 (1992.4). The data set is a balanced and we observe each cohort for 27 quarters.
B. Panel Study of Income Dynamics
We use waves 6 through 25 of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the calendar years 1972 to 1992. 15 In the 20 waves there are a total of 143,550
observations. Our sample is restricted to male heads of PSID families between the ages of 22 and 60 for whom we had at least one instance of data for three or more continuous years. Further, all observations in which the hours and food expenditure variables numbers are missing or have been assigned by the PSID staff are eliminated, as are 14 In other words non-durable consumption is the dependent variable in (24). We could also make services good 1 and non-durables good 2. We will investigate this in future work. 15 Industry and occupation are not available in earlier years. We will also not be using the waves for the years 1973, 1988, and 1989 since the food expenditure questions are not asked. observations where the individual was self-employed or in the armed services or where industry or occ upation could not be ascertained. This reduces our sample to 45,318 observations on 6,920 individuals. After imposing restrictions on hours, wage growth and food expenditures similar to those imposed by Altonji (1986) and deleting missing values, we have 38,160 observations on 6,378 males. The sample is unbalanced, and the average number of observations per individual is 5.98 years.
In estimating equations (22) and (24) 16 See the data appendix of Abowd and Card (1987) for an excellent discussion of this variable.
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The second issue relates to our handling of the food expenditure information in the PSID. Before 1980, this variable is the summation of four variables: food expenditures at home, food expenditures away from home, the bonus value of food stamps used, and the price paid for food stamps. For 1980 and thereafter it is the summation of three variables: food expenditures at home, food expenditures away from home, and food stamp bonus value. The food stamp information is unambiguously dated for the year prior to the interview date, reflecting the change in the food stamp program.
The dating of the food at home and food away from home expenditure variables is ambiguous. In both questions the individual is asked about average expenditures on these two types of food expenditures, and the actual frame for the expenditure is not specified in the question. This opens up the problem of how to date the annualized variables that are reported in the PSID. We follow Altonji (1986) and treat the annualized food expenditure information as being for the current year and convert them into 1984-dollar expenditures, using the food and beverage price index.
IV. Results
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A. Consumer Expenditure Survey
The results for the CES data are reported in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents the reduced form parameter estimates for equations (22) and (24). Table 2 reports our estimates of intertemporal labor supply elasticities using equation (28). The standard errors are produced using the delta method. We report one-sided probability values given the theoretical restriction that 11 β is strictly positive. In all cases consider we consider three specification of the underlying shadow wage equation: industry unemployment rate only; occupation unemployment rate only; and both unemployment rates.
The variables that are unknown at period t-1 are the industry unemployment rate in t, the occupation unemployment rate in t, the relative price of goods in t and the real interest rate in t. The industry (occupation) unemployment rate is the product of a dummy for the industry (occupation) chosen in t times the unemployment rate in that industry (occupation) in t. We enter the realized value of these unknown variables in t into (22) and (24) and treat these variables as endogenous. We assume that variables dated t-1 are in the information set in period t-1, and use lagged values and demographic variables as instruments. We us es 2SLS to estimate (22) and (24) and allow the errors for an individual to be correlated when calculating the standard errors. Our base instrument set is Instrument Set A, which consists of three lags of our macro variables (unemployment rates for the industry and occupation in t-1, relative prices and interest rates) along a set 17 We report only the key parameters in the paper. A complete set of parameter estimates is available in Appendix C of this paper. This appendix will be available at the authors web site. 18 Standard errors for the intertemporal elasticities are derived from those obtained from our estimates on 11 β (See Appendix B, Table B1) using the relationship that t-ratios on 11 β and η are equal.
18
of demographic variables that includes years of education. We present the results using alternative instrument matrices below.
Our base results indicate both for hours and nondurable equations that our unemployment rates ( ) :,1,2 ij ij π = are individually or jointly significant. As Ham and Reilly (2002) argue, this provides evidence of within-period nonseparabilities and this conclusion is further supported by our significant price of nondurables 12 β parameter in the hours equation. We see some sensitivity of the hours cross-price effect 12 β as we change the unemployment rate. From (26) or (27) it is clear that this parame ter plays a crucial role in determining 11 β and thus we would expect the intertemporal elasticity to show some sensitivity to the choice of unemployment rate. This conjecture is confirmed in the first panel A of Table 2 . We see that used alone, the industry unemployment rate is estimated to be 1.72 and is significant at the 10% level, while using the occupation unemployment rate alone produces an estimated elasticity of 0.98 that is significant at the five per cent confidence level. When we enter both unemployment rates only the coefficient on the occupation unemployment rate is precisely estimated at 1.18.
In Instrument set B we drop education as an instrument on the grounds that it may be endogenous. If we were estimating in levels there certainly would be strong arguments for excluding education; in our first difference framework Instrument Set A assumes that this endogeneity is no longer a problem once individual fixed effects are removed, and this may not be true . The reduced form parameters are in panel B of Table 1 and we see that the estimate of 12 β rises relative to that in panel A. When we look at the intertemporal elasticity in Table 2 we see that this has translated into somewhat higher elasticities. However, the pattern and significance of the coefficients is the same in panels A and B of Table 2 . Given this and the size of the standard errors in Table 2 , we conclude that our results are not unduly sensitive to dropping education as an instrument, and in what follows we retain it as an instrument.
We next examined the sensitivity of the results to adding lags of the macro variables. Note that the variation in the relative price of food variable (which directly determines 12 β , is all at the macro level over time -there is no idiosyncratic variation in this variable in a given quarter. In panels C and D we add a fourth lag in the relative price and the unemployment rates respectively and this has no effect on the results. In panels E and F we add a fourth lag in the real interest rate and a fourth lag in all macro variables respectively, and the results change somewhat. These moving to these two instrument sets do not affect the unemployment rate coefficients in the reduced form estimates in Table 1 , but they do lead to a smaller and less significant estimate of the price effect 12 β .
As a result, the estimate of the intertemporal elasticity is smaller and less significant in Table 2 . It is still significant for the occupational unemployment rate, although the point estimate has fallen between 0.4 and 0.6.
The conclusion that we take from the analysis of the CES data is that while most of our results on the intertemporal labor supply elasticity point to an estimate around 1.0 to 1.5; however, it could be as low as 0.5.
B. Panel Study of Income Dynamics
The results for the PSID data are reported in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 presents the reduced form parameter estimates while Table 4 report our estimates of intertemporal labor supply elasticities from the PSID. As with the CES, in both tables our base results 20 are those using Instrument Set A in which we use three lags of our macro variables along with demographic variables including education. We also present results using alternative instrument matrices below. The base results for the PSID data in panel A of Table 3 indicate that for both the hours and food equations the unemployment rates Tables 3 and 4 contain the results when education is dropped as an instrument. We again focus on the case where we enter the unemployment rates individually. Using the industry unemployment rate we obtain an elasticity of 1. 29 while using the occupation unemployment rate produces a smaller elasticity of 0.54, although both are statistically significant. The results for panels C-F are similar to those for the CES and the results certainly become less strong when we add a fourth lag of the real interest rate. Thus we would argue that the PSID results are generally consistent with the CES and also imply an elasticity in the 0.5 to 1.5 range. The PSID results are generally less strong than the CES, perhaps because of the poorer consumption measure available in the PSID.
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V. Conclusion
Like other researchers with micro data who are examining the implicit contract model, we do not have a direct estimate of the price of leisure in the model, i.e. the marginal product of labor or shadow wage. This represents an important drawback for our paper , since the goal is to provide an estimate of the intertemporal labor supply elasticity. We propose and implement a method for estimating an implicit contract model with micro data that allows us to estimate this parameter. This is accomplished by modeling the shadow wage as a function of demand variables (that are correlated with it), using a differential approach to the consumers decision problem, and taking advantage of the standard symmetry assumption associated with cross-price effects.
We have impleme nted this procedure using two data sets: the Consumer Expenditure Survey (1985.2-1992.4 ) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics . In both cases we estimate the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply to lie in the range of 0.5 to 1.5, with a majority of our results close to 1.0. Even at the lower value of this range, we are obtaining elasticities that are larger than obtained using the standard intertemporal labor supply model, and thus more likely to be consistent with existing
Real Business Cycle models. We view our results as being relatively stable across data sets and the choice of instruments, especially when one remembers that this we are modelling male labor supply behaviour and that previous estimation in the standard model or the implicit contract model has produced generally unsatisfactory results. 
